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COMMENTS
THE PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATURE, THE JUVENILE
COURTS, AND THE GHOST OF H355-A
NEED FOR RECONSIDERATION
The recent close of the 1965 Pennsylvania Legislature resulted
in the death in committee of H355, "an act to codify, amend, revise
and consolidate the law relating to the power of the juvenile
courts."' If enacted, this bill would have replaced the present
Juvenile Court Act, 2 which has been the law in this Commonwealth
for thirty-three years.
Initially, it might seem that no useful purpose would be served
by offering an obituary for H355. However, in the light of recent
pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court in Kent v.
United States,3 a re-examination of Pennsylvania's present law, as
well as the alternatives suggested by H355 and proposed amendments thereto appears justified.
In Kent, the Court held that the provision of the District of
Columbia Juvenile Court Act 4 permitting the juvenile court, after
full investigation, to waive jurisdiction to the proper criminal
court, entitled the juvenile to a hearing on the merits of the transfer, representation by counsel, and apparently, access to records of
the juvenile's social history in the possession of the juvenile court
staff. During petitioner's detention his counsel had moved for a
hearing on the basis that justice would best be served if the juvenile court retained jurisdiction and committed petitioner to a hospital. A motion was also made to give counsel access to social reports regarding his client which were in the custody of juvenile
court personnel. The juvenile court judge never ruled on these
motions, never conferred with counsel or petitioner's parents, and
never held a hearing. It did, however, issue an order stating that
after "full investigation I do hereby waive"'5 jurisdiction of petitioner, binding him over for criminal prosecution in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia.
Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court reversed Kent's
convictions in the district court and remanded the cause for a hearing de novo on the merits of waiver, believing that "this result is
1. H.B. No. 355, Reg. Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly (1965)

(excerpt from

the preamble) [hereinafter cited in the text as H355].
2. The Juvenile Court Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 243-68 (1965).
3. 86 S.Ct. 1045 (1966) [Official Report unavailable at writing].
4. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1553 (Supp. IV 1965).

5. Kent v. United States, 86 S.Ct. 1049.
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required by the statute read in the context of constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of counsel."
The
Court was careful to state that its decision was on this procedural
basis only, and thus, that it did not reach questions of substantive
due process which petitioner raised in attacking the act.7 In several obiter statements, however, Mr. Justice Fortas indicated the
Court's awareness of considerable dissatisfaction with existing juvenile court acts and procedures:
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable
purpose of juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent
years raise serious questions as to whether actual performance measures well enough against theoretical purpose to
make tolerable the immunity of the process from the reach
of constitutional guaranties applicable to adults."
It would seem fair to assume that from this and other similar comments in Kent that in a proper case, the Court would be willing
to consider questions of substantive due process in the juvenile
courts-issues with which it has been historically loath to concern
itself.9
Hence, since the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged uncertainty as to the constitutional sufficiency of present
juvenile court acts, the legislative concern manifested by the sponsors of H355 may now have received added impetus and importance.
The probability of new juvenile court legislation in future sessions
has been unquestionably enhanced.
It is not inconceivable that Pennsylvania's present statute
would, if weighed in the balance, be found wanting by our nation's
highest tribunal. It is therefore the purpose of this Comment to
examine not only the Act of 1933, but also alternative proposals,
such as H355, both as to their efficacy in carrying out the basic
philosophy of the juvenile court and their compliance with constitutional safeguards required by the United States Supreme Court.
THE JUVENILE COURT EXPERIENCE IN PENNSYLVANIA

Pennsylvania was one of the first states to enact legislation
providing for a tribunal concerned solely with the control and disposition of juveniles. 0 The Act of 190311 empowered the several
6. Id. at 1055. Since Kent is now over twenty-one, and thus not subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the remand was to the District
Court, and that tribunal is to determine the merits of the transfer of jurisdiction to it. If it determines waiver was inappropriate, Kent must be released; if it finds the waiver order proper under the circumstances, it can
proceed to take whatever measures are appropriate.
7. Id. at 1052, 1054-5.
8. Id. at 1054.
9. See, e.g., Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert.
denied 348 U.S. 973 (1955), affirming 175 Pa. Super. 137, 103 A.2d 454 (1954).
10. The first juvenile courts as they function today were established
in Chicago, Denver and Cleveland. E.g., Ill. Laws 1899, at 131. See Note,
79 HARv. L. REV. 775 (1966).
11. Pa. Laws 1903, No. 205.
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courts of quarter sessions to carry on juvenile proceedings to be
conducted without a jury and to be kept separate in all respects
from the general criminal business of the courts.12 It also allowed
the court to commit to institutions children it deemed would benefit
from such treatment, 13 and provided for the appointment of probation officers to assist the court. 14 The constitutionality of the act
was upheld in Commonwealth v. Fisher.15 The Court in answering
the appellant's argument that he had been taken into custody
without due process of law, held that the court was not criminal in
nature, and to save a child from a career of crime, the state required no process whatsoever. Fisher thereby firmly established
the role of the juvenile court in Pennsylvania-to function not as a
criminal court for children, but as the agency of the Commonwealth
acting as parens patriaeof all juveniles within its domain.
The Act of 190316 was superseded by the present juvenile court
law, the Act of 1933.17 That the new act did not change the basic
philosophy of the juvenile court in Pennsylvania was made clear
in the now famous (or infamous)' 8 decision in Holmes' Appeal, 9
wherein Chief Justice Horace Stern, writing for the majority,
stated flatly: "Juvenile Courts are not criminal courts, [and] the
constitutional rights granted to persons accused of crime are not
applicable to children brought before them .... ',20 The opinion
also upheld the parens patriae power of the state, and reaffirmed
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Pa.
Pa.
Pa.
213
Pa.

17.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 243-68 (1965).

Laws 1903, No.
Laws 1903, No.
Laws 1903, No.
Pa. 48, 62 Ati.
Laws 1903, No.

205, § 1.
205, § 4.
205, § 3.
198 (1905).
205.

18. Justice Musmanno, in a bombastic dissent, would extend constitutional guarantees to the juvenile court, and chastises the majority for condoning conduct which in his opinion violates due process. 379 Pa. 599, 610.
Although a discussion of the merits of the case is beyond the scope of this
paper, it might be noted that several commentators have expressly or impliedly espoused his position. See, e.g., Antieau, Constitutional Rights in
Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L. Q. 387 (1961); Remington, Due Process in
Juvenile Proceedings, 11 WAYNE L. REv. 688 (1965); TAPPAN, Judicial &
Administrative Approaches to Children with Problems, in JUSTICE FOR THE
CHILD 144 (1962); Note, 1 How. L. J. 277 (1955); Note, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW.

594 (1964). To be sharply contrasted is the resolution of the Pennsylvania
Council of Juvenile Court Judges, adopted August 23, 1963: "Now, therefore, be it resolved, that the Pennsylvania Council of Juvenile Court Judges
affirms its adherence to and formally adopts the philosophy of the Juvenile
Court as enunciated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, and reaffirmed in Holmes' Appeal,
379 Pa. 599."
19. 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied 348 U.S. 973 (1955),
affirming 175 Pa. Super. 137, 103 A.2d 454 (1954).

20. Id. at 605, 109 A.2d at 525. (Emphasis in original). See also Kent
v. United States, wherein the Court accepts the parens patriae theory but
notes that "the admonition to function in a 'parental' relationship is not an
invitation to procedural arbitrariness." U.S. at
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the juvenile court as the medium through which that power was to
be exercised.
In addition to the juvenile courts, there are two other organizations devoted to the cause of juvenile justice in Pennsylvania. One
is the Juvenile Court Judges' Commission, created by the legislature in 1959, as an adjunct of the Department of Justice. 21 The
commission is composed of nine judges of various juvenile courts in
the Commonwealth, who are appointed to membership by the Chief
Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 22 It is empowered to
study judicial procedures, personnel practices, and administrative
methods in the several juvenile courts, to evaluate the results of
such studies, and on the basis thereof, to establish standards and
make recommendations.2 3 Pursuant to this authority, the commission has from time to time issued reports and guidelines
to the
24
various juvenile court judges in the Commonwealth.
A strictly non-official statewide organization is the Pennsylvania Council of Juvenile Court Judges, whose regular meetings
provide judges from all parts of the state with an opportunity to
meet, discuss common problems, and make pronouncements of
25
policy in the juvenile court field.
This, then, was the juvenile court situation in Pennsylvania
when a proposed new juvenile court act, H1535, 26 was introduced
into the 1963 session of the legislature. The bill was never passed.
27
One factor in its demise was no doubt the opposition of the judges,
who felt that they had not been given sufficient opportunity to
consider the proposed legislation and its effects.
On February 23, 1965, the former H1535 was introduced without change into the 1965 session, under the designation of H355, and
was referred to the Committee on Judiciary on March 1, 1965. Its
sponsors' ostensible purpose in introducing it early in the session
was to give the judges adequate time to peruse the bill, with an
eye toward a possible resolution emanating from their summer
meeting in favor of its passage. Such an endorsement, however,
was not forthcoming; the judges instead issuing a statement proposing several changes to the bill in its original form.2 8 These
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 270 (1965).
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 270-2 (1965).
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 270-4 (1965).
24. E.g., Juvenile Court Judges' Commission Recommended Standards
of Administration for Juvenile Courts, Nov. 9, 1962; Juvenile Court Judges'
Commission Recommended Juvenile Court-Police Procedures, March 25,
1964.
25. E.g., Resolution Respecting the Philosophy of the Juvenile Court,
adopted Aug. 23, 1963, note 13 supra.
26. H.B. No. 1535, Reg. Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly (1963).
27. The Pennsylvania Council of Juvenile Court Judges expressly
opposed H1535 in their Resolution Respecting the Philosophy of the Juvenile Court, adopted Aug. 23, 1963.

28. Report of Juvenile Court Judges' Committee to Study House Bill
No. 355, Aug. 27, 1965.
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changes were not incorporated, and H355 in its original form died
in committee at the close of the 1965 session.
THE PRESENT JUVENILE COURT ACT

An analysis of juvenile courts in the United States discloses
that they may be classified into three categories: (1) Designated
courts, i.e., already-existing courts which are authorized by statute
to decide juvenile matters, and when so functioning to be known
as juvenile courts; (2) Independent courts, created by statute and
not affiliated with any other tribunal; and (3) Co-ordinated courts,
in which the juvenile court functions in cooperation with other
special courts, such as domestic relations or family courts.2 9
Under the Act of 1933 every juvenile court except the Juvenile
Court of Allegheny County is a designated court. 30 The County
Court of Philadelphia (formerly the Municipal Court) and the
courts of quarter sessions in all other counties (except Allegheny
County) are given juvenile jurisdiction. 31 When they exercise this
jurisdiction, these courts are to be known as juvenile courts.32 The
Juvenile Court of Allegheny County, on the other hand, is an independent court.3 3 It has substantially the same powers as the other
juvenile courts, and its existence as a juvenile34 court is expressly
recognized under the general juvenile court act.
The court's jurisdiction extends to delinquency, neglected and
dependent children under the age of eighteen years. 35 Its proceedings are held separately from the general criminal sessions of the
court and its records are separately docketed and withheld from
the purview of the general public. 36 Hearings before the court are
conducted without a jury.37 The setting and procedure is generally
informal, and largely within the discretion of the individual juvenile court judge. 38 Although the act is silent as to any provisions
regarding notice of the hearing, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has indicated that the parents or person in charge of
the juvenile
39
should be given notice and an opportunity to be heard.
29. Caldwell, The Juvenile Court: Its Development and Some Major
Problems, 51 J. CalM. L., C.&P.S. 493, 499 (1961).
30. The Juvenile Court Law § 1(1), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 243(1)
(1965).
31. Ibid.
32. The Juvenile Court Law § 2, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 244 (1965).
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 269 (1965).
34. The Juvenile Court Law § 1(1), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 243(1)
(1965).
35. The Juvenile Court Law § 2, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 244 (1965).
The age limit originally set forth in this section was sixteen, but was raised
to eighteen in 1939. Pa. Laws 1939, No. 226.
36. The Juvenile Court Law § 3, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 245 (1965).
37. The Juvenile Court Law § 5, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 247 (1965).

38. See Juvenile Court Judges' Commission Recommended Hearing
Procedure for Juvenile Courts, Nov. 9, 1962.
39. Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954) (dictum), cert.
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A child is brought before the juvenile court in one of three
ways: (a) Upon petition by any resident of the county to the
juvenile court. 40 (b) Upon commitment by a member of the minor
judiciary, without a preliminary hearing, 4 1 for any indictable offense other than murder, or for the violation of any state law or municipal ordinance. 42 (c) Upon transfer from the criminal court.
Such a transfer is mandatory when the child is under sixteen years
of age, and is discretionary with the criminal court if he is sixteen or
over, but less than eighteen. 43 If the charge is murder, however,
the juvenile court has no jurisdiction whatever, and44 the juvenile,
no matter what his age, is tried in the criminal courts.
The act also permits certain transfers in the opposite directionfrom the juvenile court to the criminal courts. rt empowers the
juvenile court judge to certify to the district attorney any case involving a child over fourteen who has been held by a magistrate
for any offense punishable by imprisonment in a state penitentiary
if the judge is of the opinion that the interests of the public require
prosecution. When this power is exercised and the child is so certified, the district attorney45 proceeds as though he had received the
case in the first instance.
In addition to conferring jurisdiction in all cases involving children, the act purports to give the juvenile court jurisdiction over
adults charged with contributing or encouraging juvenile delinquency, neglect or dependency, 46 and expressly creates the misdemeanor of contributing to the delinquency of any child subject to
juvenile court jurisdiction. 47 It attempts to circumvent the constitutional objection of lack of a jury trial by providing that any
adult coming before the juvenile court charged with an offense
triable by jury may demand a jury trial, and upon so doing, will be
returned to the proper criminal court. 48 The juvenile court's adult
denied 348 U.S. 973 (1955),
(1954).

40.

affirming 175 Pa. Super. 137, 103 A.2d 454

The Juvenile Court Law § 4(1),

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 246(1)

(1965).

41. Magistrates' preliminary hearings in juvenile cases are expressly
prohibited. The Juvenile Court Law § 4(3), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 246(3)
(1965).

42. The Juvenile Court Law § 4(2), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 246(2)
((1965).
43. The Juvenile Court Law § 14, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 256 (1965).
44. The exclusion of murder jurisdiction is indicated throughout the
act. E.g., The Juvenile Court Law §§ 4(2), 14, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§
246(2), 256 (1965). See also Juvenile Court Judges' Commission Recommended Jurisdiction Procedures for Juvenile Courts, and cases cited therein.
45. The Juvenile Court Law § 18, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 260 (1965).
It was the counterpart of this section in the District of Columbia act which
the Supreme Court of the United States considered in Kent. See D.C.
CODE ANN. § 11-1553 (Supp. IV, 1965).
46. The Juvenile Court Law § 2, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 244 (1965).
47. The Juvenile Court Law § 20, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 262 (1965).
48, The Juvenile Court Law § 5, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 247 (1965).
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jurisdiction, however, would seem to have been drastically curtailed
by Commonwealth v. Lash,49 wherein it was held that the juvenile
court did not have jurisdiction over indictable offenses committed
by an adult, including the offense of contributing to delinquency
which was created by the act itself. The superior court noted that
the only activity which the juvenile court could exercise in such
cases would be to return the case to the proper criminal court.
Evidently cognizant of the effect of Lash on the adult jurisdiction
of the juvenile court, the Juvenile Court Judges' Commission has
taken the position that all adult offenses should be prosecuted exclusively in the criminal courts. 50
Once the powers of the court have been brought to bear in
any individual case, the court may, if it deems fit, make any
necessary orders for compelling the presence of the child and the
attendance of parents or other persons having custody of the child
at the hearing. 5 1 At all times prior to final disposition of the
case, the child is subject to court order and may be kept in whatever custody the court deems necessary under the circumstances
including detention. Although children between sixteen and eighteen years of age may be detained in any place provided for the
custody of adults awaiting trial, the act specifically prohibits the
detention of 5any
child under sixteen in any facility wherein adults
2
are confined.
At the hearing, the judge is required to inquire into the facts,
determine whether the best interests of the child and the state require the court to assume the care, guidance and control of the child,
53
and make an appropriate order based on those determinations.
Once the court decides that the child is in need of
supervision,
it has several alternatives, including the release of the child in the
custody of its parents, or a suitable family, 54 or a reputable citizen
of good character. 55 In any of these cases, the child may be required to make periodic reports to a probation officer. 56 The court
may also commit the child to a suitable institution or incorporated
agency willing to receive it, provided that one of the objects of the
agency is the care, guidance and control of delinquent, dependent
49.

151 Pa. Super. 601, 30 A.2d 609 (1943).

50. Juvenile Court Judges' Commission Recommended
Procedures for Juvenile Courts.
51. The Juvenile Court Law § 6, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
52. The Juvenile Court Law § 7, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
53. The Juvenile Court Law § 8, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
54. The Juvenile Court Law § 8(a), PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
(1965).
55.

Jurisdiction
248
249
250
11,

(1965).
(1965).
(1965).
§ 250(a)

The Juvenile Court Law § 8(b), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 250(b)
(1965).
56. The juvenile court is empowered to appoint so many probation
officers as may be needed for the effective operation of the court. The
Juvenile Court Law § 17, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 259 (1965).
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and neglected children. 57 It may also commit the child to an industrial or training school willing to receive it,58 and in cases of children over sixteen years of age, may commit them to any state
industrial school for the reformation and correction of youths above
that age. 59 No child under twelve years of age, however, may be
committed to any institution unless probation techniques have
previously been attempted and demonstrated to have been unsuccessful 10 No neglected or dependent child who is not delinquent
shall be committed to an institution which receives delinquent
children.6 1 In any of the above cases, the court is empowered to
issue a support order on the parents of the child so committed, or
it may order the county to pay for the child's maintenance and, in
such instances, may order the parents or other persons responsible
2
for the child's welfare to reimburse the county.
Any order with respect to delinquent, dependent or neglected
children is subject to amendment or extension upon motion of the
district attorney or a probation officer, or upon the petition of any
other person in interest provided he gives five days' written
notice to the district attorney and probation office. 3 Any final
order of commitment may be reviewed within twenty-one days as a
matter of right as to any alleged errors of fact or law. 64 Also,
if subsequent to the commission of the juvenile, a change of circumstances has taken place which in the opinion of the juvenile's
parents or next friend justifies the modification or revocation of
such order, a rehearing may be had as a matter of right.65 From
the final order of a rehearing of either type, an appeal lies as a
66
matter of right to the supreme court.
The act makes it plain that civil disabilities which normally
follow upon conviction of a crime do not attach to any child brought
before the juvenile court. He is not deemed to be a criminal, nor
to have been convicted of a crime. Neither the disposition of his
case nor any evidence adduced at the hearing is admissible against
him in later proceedings against him in any court.6 7

57. The Juvenile
(1965).
58. The Juvenile
(1965).
59. The Juvenile
(1965).
60. The Juvenile
61. Ibid.
62. The Juvenile
63. The Juvenile
64. The Juvenile
65. The Juvenile
66. The Juvenile
258 (1965).
67. The Juvenile

Court Law § 8(c),

PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 11, § 250(c)

Court Law § 8(d),

PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 11, § 250(d)

Court Law § 8(e),

PA. STAT.

Court Law § 11,
Court Law
Court Law
Court Law
Court Law
Court Law

ANN. tit. 11, § 250(e)

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,

§ 253 (1965).

§ 9, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 251 (1965).
§ 12, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 254 (1965).
§ 15, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 257 (1965).
§ 16, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 258 (1965).
§§ 15, 16, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 257,

Court Law § 19,

PA. STAT.

ANN. tit. 11, § 261 (1965).
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THE PROPOSED JUVENILE COURT

AcT-H355

H355 was offered as a successor to Pennsylvania's present juvenile court act on February 23, 1965, but died in committee at
the end of the 1965 Session. Before noting some of the changes
which would be effected by its enactment, the following comments
are presented as general observations on the bill as a whole.
From the rather clinical standpoint of organization, H355 appears to be an improvement over the existing law. The bill is
divided into six articles, the first of which is devoted to definitions.
It then proceeds through the typical stages of the juvenile court
proceedings as chronologically as practicable, treating seriatim jurisdiction, initiation of proceedings and detention, hearing and decree, and administrative implementation. The concluding article
is general in nature, including the customary provisions as to construction, constitutionality, short title, effective date, and general
and specific repealers. The present act, on the other hand, is not
compartmentalized by articles, and although some lines of continuity may appear, there are some notable deviations therefrom.68
The act as a whole simply lacks the logical style of presentation
found in H355.
H355 is also more specific than the present act. In many areas
it makes definite and detailed provisions where the law is now
silent. Conceding that the silence of the Act of 1933 may exist not
as the result of poor draftsmanship, but by design, in order to
allow considerable discretion in certain areas, the difference between the two statutes in this regard is, nonetheless, readily apparent. Whether the specifities of H355 are to be preferred to the
generalities of the present act6 9 will be hereinafter considered at
greater length.
The following changes which would be brought about by the
enactment of H355 are by no means an exhaustive compendium.
They are, however, some of those which the practitioner will be
likely to encounter if the proposal should be reintroduced and even68. E.g., under the present act, the general jurisdictional section, The
Juvenile Court Law § 2, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 244 (1965), is widely
separated from either the section for transferring jurisdiction to the court,
The Juvenile Court Law § 14, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 256 (1965), or the
section for transferring jurisdiction from the court, The Juvenile Court
Law § 18, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 260 (1965).
H355, however, had its
transfer provisions to and from the court following its general jurisdictional
provisions. H.B. No. 355, Reg. Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly §§ 2-5 (1965).
69. See Kent v. United States,
U.S. at
The [District of Columbia] statute gives the Juvenile Court a substantial degree of discretion as to the factual considerations to be
considered, the weight to be given them and the conclusions to be
reached. It does not confer upon the Juvenile Court a license for
arbitrary procedure. The statute does not permit the Juvenile

Court to determine in isolation and without the participation or
representation of the child the "critically important" question
whether a child will be deprived of the special protections and
provisions of the Juvenile Court Act.
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tually passed. The Pennsylvania Council of Juvenile Court Judges
has prepared a report setting forth its recommended changes to
many of the provisions of H355, and where pertinent, these will
70
be noted.
JurisdictionalChanges
These changes are concerned basically with who may be
brought before the juvenile court, and what power the court may
exercise over such persons. These may be termed "jurisdictional
changes."
A. Transfers to and from the criminal courts.
As noted above, one way by which the juvenile court may obtain jurisdiction is by transfer from a court of oyer and terminer or
quarter sessions of a person charged with a crime other than murder if it is ascertained that such a person is less than eighteen years
of age. Under the present law, the transfer is mandatory if the
juvenile is less than sixteen years of age, and discretionary with the
71
criminal court if the juvenile is over sixteen but below eighteen.
H355 removes the existing distinction between the mandatory
transfer under sixteen and the discretionary transfer over sixteen
by flatly providing that in all cases wherein the criminal court ascertains that the defendant is under eighteen, the proceedings must
be transferred to the juvenile court. 72 This change appears to be
more consonant with the proposition expressed in both H355 and the
present act that the juvenile court is to have exclusive jurisdiction
of all children under eighteen years of age within its county,73 and
that such children as a rule are not to be subjected to criminal
proceedings.
The juvenile courts now have the power to certify to the district attorney for appropriate criminal action the case of any juvenile within their jurisdiction over the age of fourteen years, if,
in the court's opinion, the interests of the state would best be
served by prosecution on an indictment, and if the offense is one
punishable by imprisonment in a state penitentiary. 74 H355 does
not substantially change this situation, although it appears by its
terms to have included juveniles who have attained the age of
fourteen, which thereby would lower the minimum age for transfer
to the criminal court by one year.75 There would seem to be no
compelling reason for this change. Since, however, it is reasonable
to assume that most transfers to the criminal court involve juveniles
70. Report of Juvenile Court Judges' Committee to Study House Bill
No. 355, Aug. 27, 1965.

71.

72.

The Juvenile Court Law § 14, PA.

STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 256 (1965).
H.B. No. 355, Reg. Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly § 5 (1965).

73. The Juvenile Court Law § 2,

PA. STAT.

ANN. tit. 11, § 244 (1965);

H.B. No. 355, Reg. Sess. Pa. Gen Assembly § 2 (1965).

74. The Juvenile Court Law § 18, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 260 (1965).
75. H.B. No. 355, Reg. Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly § 4 (1965).
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in the other extreme of the age bracket involved, the change may
have little practical effect.
The question whether subsequent to a criminal court's mandatory transfer to a juvenile court based solely on age, the juvenile
court could then make a discretionary retransfer to the criminal
court based on a consideration of the merits, does not seem to have
been decided. There does not appear, however, to be anything in
either the present law or H355 which would preclude such action by
a juvenile court. It should be observed that the possibility of
such an action is enlarged by the provisions of H355 making mandatory all transfers from the criminal court,7 6 whereas under present
transfer provisions apply only to juveniles unlaw, the mandatory
7
der sixteen. "
B. Summary offenses under the Vehicle Code.
Since neither the present juvenile court act nor the Vehicle
Code 8 appears to have an express provision for jurisdiction over
summary offenses involving motor vehicles committed by juveniles,
present practice seems to treat these cases as involving concurrent
jurisdiction between the magistrates and the juvenile court. In
accord with this approach is the position of the Juvenile Court
Judges' Commission that, at least insofar as juveniles over sixteen
are concerned, such offenses "lie within the purview of both juvenile courts and magistrate courts.' '7 9 Although there are few reported decisions in this area, a lower court dictum in Commonwealth v. Kmit8 0 has indicated that if the question of age is raised
before the magistrate in a summary motor vehicle proceeding,
the case should be certified to the juvenile court for disposition.
Kmit held, however, that when a juvenile of seventeen made no
issue of age before the magistrate, but raised the question for the
first time on appeal to the court of quarter sessions, that that
court had discretion in determining whether to certify the case to
the juvenile court. Exercising this discretion, the court in Kmit
refused to so certify, retained jurisdiction, and affirmed the summary conviction.
H355 removes any doubts as to jurisdiction in this field by
specifically exempting summary offenses under the Vehicle Code
from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.81 In so doing, it leaves
exclusive original jurisdiction in such cases to the magistrate courts.
However useful the provision may be in clarifying the law as to
jurisdiction, it does not necessarily follow that its overall effects on
the juvenile himself will be so salutary. Concededly, many, per76. H.B. No. 355, Reg. Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly § 5 (1965).
77. The Juvenile Court Law § 14, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 256 (1965).
78. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §§ 101-1503 (1960).

79. Juvenile Court Judges' Commission Recommended Jurisdiction
Procedures for Juvenile Courts.
80. 81 Pa. D. & C. 135 (Ct. of Quarter Sess. 1951).

81.

H.B. No. 355, Reg. Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly §:2(1) (1965).
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haps a majority, of motor vehicle violations by juveniles can be
satisfactorily disposed of in summary proceedings before magistrates. Nonetheless, situations undoubtedly present themselves
wherein the unique facilities of the juvenile court would be more
beneficial to the juvenile offender, and to society as a whole, than
would a perfunctory appearance before a magistrate. It can be
argued that H355 has not overlooked such instances, since the court
of quarter sessions on appeals from the summary convictions must
certify the cases to the juvenile court.82 But why not permit the
juvenile court to hear these cases ab initio? This would not only be
advantageous to the juvenile, since his case would be speedily
determined by the juvenile court in the first instance, but it would
also help to clear the already overburdened quarter sessions dockets
and reduce some of the paper work in connection with the administration of that court.
It is submitted that the suggested change to this provision of
H355 which has been promulgated by the Pennsylvania Council of
Juvenile Court Judges 3 handles the problem effectively, and is to
be preferred to H355 in its original form. The existing unclear
jurisdictional problem would be eliminated by a specific provision
that the juvenile courts and the minor judiciary have concurrent
jurisdiction in motor vehicle cases. Such a provision would also
enable the juvenile court to take immediate original jurisdiction in
those cases where it is indicated that the child and/or society requires its attention, and in so doing, would most effectively uphold
the underlying philosophy of the juvenile court itself.
C. Murder jurisdiction.
Present Pennsylvania law excludes murder from the juvenile
court's jurisdiction, thus requiring a juvenile so charged to stand
8 4
trial in the criminal courts just as though he were an adult.
H355 would appear to have made a drastic change in this situation.
Under its general jurisdiction provisions, the court has exclusive
original jurisdiction over any child "who is alleged to have violated
any federal, state or local law. . ." 5 Since murder is nowhere
specifically excepted from this provision, it may thus be concluded
that the bill confers jurisdiction in murder cases on the juvenile
court.
It should be observed that H355's transfer provisions are also
relevant here. The juvenile court would be permitted to transfer
to the appropriate criminal court any case involving a child fourteen or older if, in the opinion of the juvenile court, the best interests of the child or the public so dictate.8 6 The proposal goes on to
82.
83.
No. 355,
84.
85.
86.

H.B. No. 355, Reg.
Report of Juvenile
Aug. 27, 1965.
See note 39 supra.
H.B. No. 355, Reg.
H.B. No. 355, Reg.

Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly § 5 (1965).
Court Judges' Committee to Study House Bill
Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly § 2(1) (1965).
Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly § 4 (1965).
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provide that in cases of murder, the juvenile court may8 7make such a
certification regardless of the age of the child involved.
The arguments as to whether a juvenile court should be given
murder jurisdiction are legion. Those who would deny it point up
the serious nature of a murder charge, arguing that society demands that a murderer be brought to justice no matter what his
age might be, and that a failure to punish such an offender not only
stimulates others to commit crimes, but also disgusts the public to
the extent that they are unwilling to cooperate with law-enforcement officials."8 On the other hand, proponents of juvenile court
murder jurisdiction feel that there is a basic inconsistency in allowing the juvenile court to decide cases involving lesser offenses,
while those juveniles who have killed, and who, for this reason, are
probably most in need of the facilities of the juvenile court, must
instead stand in the criminal courts. Such a practice, to the holders
of this view, is directly antithetical to the basic juvenile court concepts of care, guidance and non-criminal status.8 9
Undoubtedly, valid arguments can be marshaled on either side
of the question, an ultimate determination of which is beyond the
scope of this paper. It would seem that H355 adopts a compromise
position in the matter by conferring murder jurisdiction on the
juvenile court at the outset, but giving the court discretion to
certify any case of murder to the criminal courts if it feels that the
seriousness of the alleged acts so require, regardless of the age of
the offender involved. Such a position is, of course, probably unacceptable to extremists in either camp, but it seems to offer a just
and workable solution which gives due regard to the needs of the
juvenile on the one hand, and the demands of society on the other.
D. Jurisdiction in adult cases.
The provisions of the present juvenile court act regarding adult
jurisdiction,9" and subsequent Pennsylvania appellate interpretations thereof, 91 have been previously noted. The conclusions there
reached indicate that the juvenile court's existing adult jurisdiction
is rather empty, since it appears that the court cannot actively try
adults charged with indictable offenses against children, but must
return such cases to the criminal courts.
H355 makes it definite that the juvenile court would have no
trial jurisdiction whatsoever over adults. It does give the juvenile
court in first and second class counties exclusive original jurisdiction to hold preliminary hearings in all cases involving adults
charged with offenses against children. In all other counties this
87.
88.
89.
(1949).
90.
(1965).
91.

Ibid.
See Caldwell, supra note 29, at 503-4.
Ibid. See Schramm, The Juvenile Court Idea, 13
The Juvenile Court Law §§ 2, 5,
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jurisdiction is to be concurrent with magistrates, aldermen, and
justices of the peace.9 2 Such preliminary hearing jurisdiction
appears to be the extent of power over adults conferred by H355
on the juvenile courts.
It is submitted that H355 makes a change for the better in this
regard, not only because it establishes adult jurisdiction with some
degree of certainty, but also because it places this jurisdiction where
it has always belonged-in the criminal courts.93 The fundamental
rights and constitutional guarantees afforded an adult charged
with a crime would seem to be more secure in courts traditionally
empowered to decide criminal matters than under the usual juvenile court proceedings where a non-criminal attitude is an a priori
condition. It has also been suggested that this practice will be
helpful in convincing the public of the special nature of the juvenile court by emphasizing that it is in no way a criminal tribunal.
ProceduralChanges
Other changes effected by H355 are concerned with how the
court should deal with the juvenile once jurisdiction over his person is obtained. Consequently, they might be designated "procedural changes."
A. Temporary custody and detention.
There are several provisions in H355 which have absolutely no
counterpart in the Act of 1933. One such provision is that part of
the proposal dealing with procedures to be followed in taking the
juvenile into custody, which
establishes time limits for detention,
94
hearing and disposition.
After indicating the circumstances under which a peace officer
may take a child into custody without a court order, H355 goes on
to prescribe in detail the detention procedures to be followed once
custody is established: (1) The officer must immediately notify the
parents or guardian of the child. (2) The child shall be released
in the custody of his parents or guardians unless his immediate welfare or the interests of the community requires that he be detained.
(3) No child shall be held in police custody, detention or shelter
for more than twenty-four hours, excluding Sundays and holidays,
unless a petition has been filed. (4) No child may be held longer
than twenty-four hours after the filing of a petition unless so or9 5
dered by the juvenile court.
Possibly because the present act is silent as to specific detention
requirements, the Juvenile Court Judges' Commission issued a fairly comprehensive statement of suggested detention procedures in
92.
93.
94.
95.

H.B. No. 355, Reg. Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly § 7 (1965).
See Caldwell, supra note 29, at 509.
H.B. No. 355, Reg. Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly § 12 (1965).
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1962.96 It might be noted that several of the commission's recommendations have been incorporated into those provisions of H355
mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.
The proposal provides that in all cases of children so detained,
a juvenile court hearing should be held as soon as possible, but no
later than seventy-two hours after the filing of the petition. If
no judge is available in the county at that time, the judge of an
adjacent county shall conduct the hearing. Final disposition in the
cases of children so detained must be made within thirty days of
the first hearing, unless a later date is ordered by the court for
reasons which must be placed in the record."'
There seems to be no apparent reason why a reasonable detention procedure should not be set forth in a juvenile act, rather
than having its basis solely in the non-binding pronouncements of a
state agency. Of course, it may be argued that flexibility is required in order for the juvenile court to properly function, and
that in some cases, a "good scare," supposedly provided by detention for a period of time, is just the proper therapy to put the
juvenile back on the right track. Without attempting a value judgment on the merits of the latter proposition, it will be conceded
that a reasonable flexibility is desirable. Nonetheless, it would
seem that some type of "minimal due process" must be observed
in the detention proceeding, notwithstanding the view so well established in this state that the juvenile court is not a criminal
court and the constitutional guarantees appertaining to such a
court therefore do not apply to juvenile proceedings.9
It is submitted that most of the detention procedures set
forth in H355 neither unduly hamper the activity of the juvenile
court, nor unreasonably impinge on individual liberty. The workability of one provision of the bill in this area, however, has been
questioned by the Pennsylvania Council of Juvenile Court Judges.
The judges are of the opinion that the seventy-two hour ceiling on
detention without a hearing is not feasible under present conditions in the Pennsylvania judicial system. Two reasons supporting
their contentions have been advanced: That because of the tremendous backlog in metropolitan areas, often requiring visiting judges
not familiar with the juvenile or his environment, a mandatory
seventy-two hour ceiling is physically impossible; and that in onejudge districts, a judge engaged in an extended trial or other litigation would find it most difficult to comply with the seventy-two
hour maximum. The judges, therefore, have proposed that the
hearing should be held "not later than seventy-two hours, if feasible, but, in no event, not later than seven days after the filing of
96. Juvenile Court Judges' Commission Recommended Detention Procedures for Juvenile Courts, Nov. 9, 1962.

97. H.B. No. 355, Reg. Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly § 12 (1965).
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the petition." 99
No doubt considerable weight should be given to the judges'
suggestion, since they, themselves, are certainly in the best position
to know how busy they are, and they are the persons who will have
to live and work with H355 or a similar proposal should it become
law. In light of the judges' concern as to this provision of H355,
perhaps sponsors of future juvenile court legislation might take
their reasons into consideration when framing detention provisions.
H355 also sets forth regulations concerning the facilities to be
provided for juveniles taken into temporary detention. One requirement is that a child whose alleged activities place him in the
"delinquent" category may not be temporarily detained in a place
where children who may be termed "dependent" or "neglected" are
detained. 100 Although the present act recognizes this distinction in
respect to final commitment, 10 1 it is silent as to the requirement of
such a distinction during detention prior to the hearing.
In addition, H355 generally prohibits the confinement of any
child in a prison cell or similar high-security facility. The court
may, however, if conditions warrant, detain juveniles from sixteen
to eighteen in a place provided for the custody of adults awaiting
trial, but it would appear from the act that such place must not
have the prison characteristics which are specifically prohibited.
The only exception to a prison-type detention is in the case of a
child sixteen or older whose conduct endangers the safety of himself or others in the detention facility for children. In such instances, the court may commit the juvenile to some other place of
confinement, including a jail or other place of adult detention if the
judge deems it proper. 10 2 The bill specifically authorizes two or
more counties to jointly operate detention facilities meeting its
03
requirements.
H355's provisions for temporary detention facilities are more
rigorous than those imposed by the Act of 1933. It has already been
observed that the present law makes no distinction for purposes
of temporary detention between delinquent children on the one
99.

Report of Juvenile Court Judges' Committee to Study House Bill

No. 355, Aug. 27, 1965.
100. Under the present law, juveniles coming under the court's jurisdiction are classified as "delinquent," "neglected," or "dependent." The
Juvenile Court Law §§ 1(4)-1(6), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 243(4)-243(6)
(1965). The proposed bill nowhere so designates juveniles, but instead
prescribes several types of activities or statuses which bring a juvenile
within the jurisdiction of the court. H.B. No. 355, Reg. Sess. Pa. Gen.
Assembly §§ 2(1)-2(6) (1965). The first four provisions roughly correspond to "delinquent" as defined by the present law; the remaining two
being analagous to "dependent" and "neglected," respectively.
101. The Juvenile Court Law § 11, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 253 (1965).
102. H.B. No. 355, Reg. Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly § 11 (1965).
103. H.B. No. 355, Reg. Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly § 24 (1965).
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hand, and dependent or neglected children on the other. The Act of
1933 does prohibit the temporary detention of any child under sixteen in a prison-type facility wherein adults are confined,10 4 but
this seems to be as far as it goes. The present law would not
appear to bar the use of a prison-type facility utilized exclusively
in juvenile cases, nor the detention of a juvenile sixteen to eighteen
in such a facility even though adults are confined therein, both of
which commitments would be prohibited by H355.
Probably because of the change in existing juvenile detention
facilities which a strict compliance with H355 would require, the
Pennsylvania Council of Juvenile Court Judges has opposed this
section, instead advocating the retention of the current law on the
subject. 10 5 Their objection seems to be based more on the difficulties of implementation of the bill's provisions rather than a disagreement as to the rightness or wrongness of the provisions themselves, since the observation has been made that they would have
no objection to H355's detention requirements if the facilities
envisioned by the act were presently available in each county. 10 6
Here again, the comments of the judges are entitled to consideration. The suitability of existing temporary detention facilities
in light of the requirements of H355, and the expense involved in
either converting old facilities to conform to H355, or in constructing new ones consistent therewith, are certainly important factors
to be taken into consideration by the bill's proponents. Since a
detailed study of these factors obviously cannot be pursued here, we
can- only acknowledge the position of the juvenile court judges on
the question, and presume that the sponsors of any forthcoming
legislation will act only after a thorough consideration of the many
factors involved.
B. The juvenile's rights at the hearing.
Another silent area of the present law in which H355 speaks out
involves the conduct of the hearing itself, and the rights of the
juvenile at the hearing. Under the present act, the hearing provision merely states that the judge shall inquire into the facts and
determine whether the best interests of the child and the state require the court to undertake the care, guidance and control of
the child.10 7
As it has done in other. areas of the Act of 1933 where the wording is of a general nature, the Juvenile Court Judges' Commission
has issued a. statement of recommended hearing procedures. 0 8.
104. The Juvenile Court Law § 7, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 249 (1965).
105. Report of Juvenile Court Judges' Committee to Study House Bill
No. 355, Aug. 27, 1965.

106. Letter from The Hon. Paul S. Lehman, Chairman, Pennsylvania

Council of Juvenile Court Judges, to Albert G. Rutherford, Nov. 12, 1965.
107. The Juvenile Court Law § 8, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 250 (1965).

108. Juvenile Court Judges' Commission Recommended Hearing Pro-

cedure for Juvenile Courts, Nov. 9, 1962.
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While emphasizing the non-adversary nature of the proceedings, the
commission states that rudimentary elements of due process, such as
notice of the hearing and the right to counsel should be afforded the
juvenile, although it contemplates counsel's role not so much as an
advocate, but as an officer of the court, present to assist the judge in
arriving at the just result in each case.
The proposed bill enacts many of these recommendations into
law. It provides that as soon as practicable, notice of the hearing
must be given to the child, if he is of sufficient understanding, and
to his parents or guardian. This notice must also advise that the
child has the right to be represented by counsel at every stage of
the proceeding. If the child or his parent or guardian requests
counsel but is financially unable to employ an attorney, the court
must furnish one. A child alleged to be "delinquent" is given the
right to compel the attendance of witnesses at the hearing, and to
examine and cross-examine any witness. 10 9
Although it may be contended that such provisions would tend
to turn the juvenile court hearing into an adversary proceeding and
place undue emphasis on technical rules of evidence and constitutional law, it is submitted that here, as in the case of detention, the
juvenile is entitled to a "minimal due process" and that the degree
of informality desired in the juvenile court can be maintained notwithstanding these provisions. 1 0 In fact, even under the present
law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has indicated that notice of
the hearing should be given,"' and, as has been already noted, the
Juvenile Court Judges' Commission recommends that juveniles and
parents should be advised that they may be represented by a lawyer. 112 Because a high percentage of juveniles brought before the
court freely admit the alleged acts of delinquency, fact issues are
often averted, and consequently, the need for examination and
cross-examination of witnesses in order to arrive at a decision is
not so great as may first appear. 1 3 It would thus seem that the
hearing provisions of H355 present no earthshaking deviations
from present practice, yet they give the individual juvenile an assurance that his rights will be protected-guarantees which now de109. H.B. No. 355;:Reg. Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly § 14 (1965). The use
here of the term "delinquent" is in accordance with the explanation in
note 95 supra.
110. See Kent v. United States,
U.S. at
111. Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954) (dictum), cert.
denied 348 U.S. 973 (1955), affirming 175 Pa. Super. 137, 103 A.2d 154
(1954).
112. Juvenile

Court Judges' Commission Recommended Hearing Pro-

cedures for Juvenile Courts, Nov. 9, 1962. Whether the mandate of Gideon
v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), extends to the juvenile courts independent

of statutory provision is discussed in "Counsel for the Child," Position
Statements & Commentaries Prepared for the National Council of Juvenile
Court Judges, Feb. 27-29, 1964, pp. 1-5.1
113. See Alexander, Constitutional Rights in the Juvenile Court, 46
A.B.A.J. 1206, 1208 (1960), reprinted in slightly altered form in JusTicE FoR
TH CHILD 82, 87 (1962).
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pend on the individual attitudes of the particular judge involved.
C. Disposition.
Under the present act, the juvenile court judge has many available alternatives in the disposition of any particular case, including
commitment of the juvenile to a public or private institution concerned with the care, guidance and control of delinquent, neglected
or dependent children. 114
With respect to juveniles who Would be considered as "delinquent" under the present law," 5 H355 would continue to allow the
court to commit such children to private agencies, 1 6 but would
require placement by a state department or local public welfare
agency if commission in a public facility were desired. 1 7 This has
been opposed by the Pennsylvania Council of Juvenile Court Judges, who are of the opinion that any selection of an institution is
to be left to the juvenile court."" While there is considerable
merit in this position, since the judges have been in close contact
with the child, which presumably results in an appreciation of what
type of care would be most beneficial to him, there may be cases
where, because of lack of time on the part of the judge, or an
inadequate probation staff, the court might wish to turn over the
placement of a child to an agency especially committed to the task of
ascertaining which institution would be most beneficial to him.
A simple solution would be to make the rule regarding commission to a public facility optional with the court. By so doing, the
court would be able to make the commission to such a facility on
its own motion, should it decide to do so, or on the other hand, it
could have the child placed in the appropriate public facility by an
agency provided for that task, should this course be deemed preferable in a particular case.
CONCLUSION
It cannot be denied that the legislative history of H355, and its
precursor in the 1963 session, H1535, appears to be one of apathy,
since both bills died in committee. Perhaps this was due to a general satisfaction with the present law, especially on the part of the
juvenile court judges, who undoubtedly have considerable influence
on any proposed legislation in the field.
Nonetheless, the time may be fast approaching when Pennsylvania judges and legislators cannot afford to be satisfied with the
Act of 1933. Its broad grants of discretion and lack of standards
The Juvenile Court Law § 8, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 250 (1965).
115. For explanation of the term "delinquent" in this context, see
note 95 supra.
114.
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are exactly the evils pointed out in Kent. On the other hand, proposals such as H355, replete with legislative guidelines in tune with
modern constitutional development would appear to meet any requirements which the United States Supreme Court may be expected to establish in the near future. Further, it is submitted that
such legislation would not hamstring judges in carrying out the
parens patriaeconcept of the juvenile court in Pennsylvania.
In view of the rapid pace in the development of today's constitutional law, the adequacy of the present juvenile court act is by
no means guaranteed. Whether the answer be a reintroduction of
H355, or H355 along with the recommendations of the judges, or a
completely new bill, is left to the informed judgment of the legislature. It is submitted, however, that some action is necessary-the
handwriting is on the wall.
ALBERT G. RUTHERFORD, II

